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intersubjectivity (and so of the people we encounter) over against the
potentially idolatrous worship of moral abstractions. Abstractions can become fierce gods, and they sometimes demand human sacrifice. In this
and later chapters, their construals of the positions of Plato and Ockham
are similarly subject to criticism. Still, I think we can cut Baggett and Walls
a good deal of slack. They are not arguing against Ockham the man, but
against a view they have identified as Ockhamism, and if they have failed
to include in this criticism all possible versions of Ockhamism, their criticisms of this version are keen and instructive. The same goes for their presentation of the Euthyphro problem. Those of us who spend our lives in
Plato’s texts might not recognize their explanation of the problem from the
eponymous dialogue, but we can nevertheless look at the problem they do
address with admiration of their philosophical insight and rigor. To their
credit, they make a small nod in the direction of Sartrean intersubjectivity
in chapter 5 when putting (a little) distance between themselves and the
moral arguments of William Lane Craig (100).
This book has a clear aim, and a clear trajectory, and watching Baggett
and Walls follow that trajectory is instructive and rewarding. While I am
not certain that they succeed in making their argument as simple or as accessible as they had hoped, the book has the great strength of giving us a
fresh and serious look at a topic that might matter more than anything else.

The Poetics of Evil: Towards an Aesthetic Theodicy, by Philip Tallon. Oxford
University Press, 2012. xx + 251 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
David Brown, The Divinity School, University of St. Andrews
As the title of his book indicates, Tallon seeks to restore an aesthetic dimension in Christian approaches to the problem of evil. However, rather
than placing them alongside moral considerations where the aesthetic
inevitably comes a poor second, he suggests that it be thought more in
terms of Eleonore Stump’s second person perspective, insights that can
enrich the believing Christian’s understanding of the nature of the divine
creation. To that end, Tallon’s discussion proceeds by three stages, taking
in turn the traditional harmony argument (with good balancing evil) and
then the issue of tragedy before turning finally to more recent discussions
of “horrors.”
Tallon’s interest in the first issue appears to have taken its rise from dissatisfaction with Barth’s familiar remark that the music of Mozart enabled
him to hear “the whole context of providence.” The balance of light and
shade emerges, Tallon suggests, much more clearly in many another composer, and indeed Irenaeus’s more dynamic, symphonic understanding is
better than Augustine’s essentially static picture. Yet it is Augustine who
is defended at length from a number of critiques, including the claim of
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Madden and Hare that the perception and acceptance of such a harmonic
balance must undermine any strong motivation to correct injustice. On
tragedy Tallon takes issue with George Steiner’s claim that “Christianity
is an anti-tragic vision of the world,” arguing that this is to misunderstand the nature of tragedy which, as Iris Murdoch rightly saw, is a mixed
genre both in the nature of the principal character (at once innocent and
guilty) and in the outcome (elements of the comic and of hope are never
entirely absent). And so the solution is not, as with David Bentley Hart,
to attack the “elitism” of the tragic vision as a morally suspect substitute
for complete integration within the overall harmony, but rather to accept
its full power in the particular moment, while at the same time welcoming the impetus it also gives to compassion and resistance. On Murdoch’s
account, Auschwitz could not be described as tragic because it offers no
consolation and so her preferred description was as a “horror,” the same
term employed by Marilyn McCord Adams to identify the class of events
that she sees as such a strong challenge to Christian theology. Tallon accepts Adams’s basic contention that theodicy must provide a personal
answer to each suffering individual. Although he suggests that Adams’s
low view of humanity introduces an overall incoherence into her position
(how is a shared moral discourse with God then possible?), he endorses
two of its key elements that he takes to be aesthetic: first, the compensatory vision of the divine beauty in heaven; and, secondly, the ability
to identify with Christ’s suffering on the cross. It is the last with which
the book ends, leaving, as he puts it, Augustine behind in order “to find
a bloodier but more satisfying beauty: a beauty scourged, shamed, and
crowned with thorns.”
Such a brief outline scarcely does justice to Tallon’s rich discussion in
which the views of numerous contemporary philosophers and theologians are considered. Indeed, at times one might have wished for more
detailed reflection from the author himself since, inevitably, the very
range of reference produces a more complex presentation than might
otherwise have been the case. Here, all I can do is focus on Tallon’s three
categories and certain tensions that result from the author’s failure to
apply a single understanding of the beautiful or at any rate explain how
they relate to one another. Ironically, it is in some ways the most ancient
and the most modern that are the closest, for, despite Adams’s insistence
on the requirement of a solution for each and every individual (with
which no ancient writer would have agreed), her balancing of a personal
vision of divine beauty over against past horrors merely replicates on the
individual scale what Augustine would have applied on the corporate
with his principle of harmony. The same, however, cannot be said for the
tragic. The tragic acquires what beauty it may have, as Tallon admits, not
through any ultimate resolution but in the particularity of the moment,
in, for example, the dignity with which the hero faces his fate. In short, if
the word beauty is to be used, it is now at quite a distance from any of the
classical notions of proportion and balance. One could of course respond
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that proportion remains in the lot of the individual being deserved but,
while perhaps true in many cases, it is not this fact alone that legitimates
the term “tragic” but rather the manner in which whatever desert is
present is transcended. Indeed, the closer an account gets to the merely
deserved and so to proportion, the further does it seem to stray from
what we customarily call the tragic.
The problem then intensifies when we try to assimilate the life of Christ
to either category. On the classical model, the features to which appeal is
made are usually purely extrinsic, the tree of the Fall balancing the wood
of the Cross and so on. This is not to say that such features are unimportant. They add to the fittingness of things, as Anselm and many another
would have stressed. They can even touch the very heart of what was
occurring on the Cross, as in Paul’s “as by one man” (Rom. 6.12ff.). But
that is not commonly how the Cross is approached today, nor how it is
used in Fallon and Adams, where identification with those suffering is the
all-important issue, and so the Cross is in effect made to parallel the tragic.
While it is easy to see how someone in pain might have their troubles
eased by reflecting on Christ’s own suffering and his presence with them
now in their agony, it is harder to make sense of Adams’s claim that this
could be absorbed retrospectively as sufficient compensation or explanation. Although Tallon endorses Adams at this point, his concern seems less
with the mechanism of how exactly such suffering might contribute and
more with the legitimacy of seeing an aesthetic dimension to that contribution. Yet, as the quotation above would seem to indicate, Tallon does
not give this either the traditional classical or tragic form. Instead, the suffering itself is declared beautiful.
This way of putting matters is now a common theme among contemporary theologians. It could of course be interpreted as shorthand for the
nobility of life and attitude expressed through the scourging and crucifixion, and then it would once more be aligned with the aesthetics of the
tragic. But usually a somewhat different claim seems to be in play: that the
suffering itself was made beautiful by the fact of he who bore it. In other
words, the divinity inherent in the act as itself the source of all beauty is
allowed to redefine what it is to be beautiful under such circumstances.
Yet, ought not such an idea to be resisted on both linguistic and theological grounds? The linguistic objection is that it creates a usage that prevents common discussion across religious boundaries. No one except a
Christian will speak in this way. But for me the theological objection is still
more telling. Effectively, it prevents us from describing the incarnation as
divine engagement with what God is not: engagement not just with the
limitations of human nature but also with the dreadful realities of evil and
ugliness. They are redeemed not by being denied but by goodness and
beauty being allowed to emerge through them or in their despite.
In short, while Tallon seems exactly on the right lines in insisting on the
relevance of the aesthetic, I remain puzzled by how he might integrate such
competing, alternative descriptions of the beautiful into a single overall
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coherent account, surely a necessity if they are claimed to all have their
source in God. Perhaps part of the trouble is that so little is written today
on what it might mean to call God beautiful. Of course, if something like
Aquinas’s three criteria for beauty were to be employed, the application to
God makes good sense, but then the word is seldom now used in this way.
Even cutting the Gordian knot and switching to an alternative term such as
the aesthetically pleasing would provide only the superficial appearance of
a solution, since, given the quite different sources of Tallon’s three categories, what significance, if any, attaches to the use of the shared term would
still remain as mysterious as ever, and still more so how it might find its
ultimate source in God. So one looks forward to a sequel from the author
to this challenging and fascinating book that will carry forward discussion
of such questions.

Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition,
by Kevin W. Hector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 293
pages. $75.00 (paperback).
Jeff Snapper, University of Notre Dame
In Theology without Metaphysics Kevin Hector endeavors to rid theology of
metaphysics without giving up true beliefs about God. Why should anyone want theology to be metaphysics-free? Because of the violence thesis,
the thesis that metaphysics (and anything that is metaphysical) does violence to objects by forcing them into categories. Given the violence thesis,
if theology is metaphysical, it does violence to God. Hector, admirably,
wants to do theology without doing violence to God. He endorses the
violence thesis. He concludes (rightly, given his premises) that we should
rid theology of metaphysics.
The worry, however, is that if we rid theology of metaphysics we are
going to be left without any true beliefs about God. We want to believe, for
example, that God is good. But we also want to get rid of any metaphysical overtones that belief might have. Once those overtones are eliminated,
the belief may well come out not true. And that price—no true theological beliefs—is too high for Hector. So, after filtering the toxic metaphysics
out of the wholesome theology, we also need a non-toxic account of true
theological beliefs.
Hector’s book has three main parts. Chapter 1 tries to remove the nasty
metaphysics from the nourishing theology. Chapters 2–5 try to explain
how theological beliefs can be true without help from metaphysics; they
begin with concept use (chapter 2), move through meaning and reference
(chapters 3–4), and conclude with a novel account of truth (chapter 5).
Chapter 6 applies Hector’s original account of truth to specific beliefs.
Here I focus on chapters 1 and 5.

